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Abstract. World fisheries are characterized by ecological, economic and social costs 
which are not taken into account by current market mechanisms. However, the 
sustainability of ecosystems and fishing activities depends on their being taken into 
account in order to arrive at the most appropriate management decisions. The 
European research programme ECOST (Ecosystem, Society, Consilience
Precautionary principle: Development of an assessment method of the societal cost 
for best fishing practices and efficient public policies) develops an integrative 
approach to the various costs generated by fishing activities. In doing so it seeks to 
develop a decision-making tool which can contribute to the success of the Plan of 
Implementation proposed at the Johannesburg summit.  
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Résumé. Les pêcheries mondiales sont caractérisées par des coûts écologiques, 
économiques et sociaux qui ne sont pas pris en compte par les mécanismes de 
marchés actuels. Or la pérennité des écosystèmes et des activés de pêche dépend de 
leur prise en compte afin de prendre les décisions d’aménagement les plus 
appropriées. Le programme de recherche européen en coopération ECOST 
(Ecosystèmes, Société, Consilience et Principe de précaution : développement d’une 
méthode d’évaluation des coûts sociétaux pour parvenir à des pratiques de pêche et 
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des politiques publiques durables)  développe une approche intégrative des différents 
coûts engendrés par les activités de pêche ainsi que les politiques publiques. Il tend 
de la sorte à développer un outil d’aide à la décision pouvant contribuer à la réussite 
du plan d’implémentation du sommet de Johannesbourg.  
Mots clés. ECOST --  Ecosystème – Consilience -- Coûts sociétaux – Pêche -- Océan
Introduction 
When one decides to build a dam or any other structure, one carries out an economic 
feasibility study together with an analysis of environmental impact. When one decides 
to carry out a fishing project there is a tendency to only analyse its financial and 
economic feasibility. Why is there no environmental evaluation of the effects which 
will be induced by the project? The fishing project will contribute to the improvement 
of production, generating additional added value, employment upstream and/or 
downstream, etc.  It is seen as an a priori "good". On the contrary, the dam is viewed 
at the same time as potentially injurious to human, animal or vegetable populations as 
the rise in water levels leads to the displacement or worse, extinction of a species. 
Without resorting to the same provocative manner as Ost (1997), who asks whether 
trees have the right to vote, it nevertheless seems appropriate to question the 
legitimacy of ecosystem protection if fishing projects continue to be undertaken with 
no accompanying environmental impact study. What would the ecosystem think of 
the construction of a new unloading dock, a new processing plant, the introduction of 
more powerful ships, the use of more “efficient” fishing gears? Without an 
environmental impact study, it seems that the voice of the ecosystem cannot be heard.  
     Is this the same as saying that the protection and the conservation of resources are 
forgotten aspects of fishing policies and projects? Apparently not, since each fisheries 
policy/project is presented as showing that the health of the ecosystem is what it holds 
dear to its heart. So why then not formulate conservation policies and conceive 
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development projects which are articulated around the conservation of the resources 
and their ecosystem? Unfortunately, conservation concerns generally rank lower in 
the management process - where the development or the maintenance of the industry 
has priority.  
     How is it that, in spite of the application of the principles of sustainable 
development, the promotion of responsible fishing, and the adoption of the 
precautionary approach, fishing today often rides roughshod over ecosystem needs. 
The answer undoubtedly lies in the logics of fisheries management which are applied. 
Sall (2007, in this issue) showed that fishing policies in West Africa still operate 
according to a developmental paradigm that considers industrial fisheries as modern 
and sees artisanal fisheries as an archaic production form that will disappear over 
time. Public decision makers are thus obliged to modernize and develop their 
fisheries. However, given the inexorable decline of fisheries resources in the majority 
of the world’s oceans and rivers (1), the question of reconciling the development (or 
maintenance) of a fisheries sector with the well-being of the underlying ecosystems 
becomes central.   
     Therefore, the first question to be addressed – particularly in the light of the 
Johannesburg Plan of Implementation - is the following: Is it possible to develop tools 
that aid decision-making (evaluating the environmental effects of fishing projects, the 
introduction of new vessels, for example) within the fisheries sector in a way that will  
allow ecosystems to be restored by 2015? Secondly, if so, how should this be done so 
as to maximize the chances of success? 
     The structure of the paper that follows addresses these questions. First, we detail 
how the market mechanism presently fails to incorporate the ecosystem effectively 
within the development of fishing policies. This leads us to suggest that current 
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notions of value need to be extended so as to embrace the concept of societal cost. We 
then apply these ideas by coupling the concept of societal cost to the ecosystem model 
Ecopath. This forms the basis for the ECOST model approach which seeks to model 
aspects of the link between ecology, economy and sociology. A brief conclusion 
completes the article. 
Traditional management approaches and external costs  
The techniques of bio-economic modeling of fisheries, developed largely from the 
1950s onwards, draw primarily upon standard economic theory. Yet while the use of 
such models permitted significant theoretical advances in the practice of fishery 
management, their actual application failed to fulfill the hopes of economists 
(Meuriot, 1987). Maximization of individual profit and the fishery rent under 
technical and resource scarcity constraints, and the adjustment of supply and demand 
through the mechanism of prices, had seemed to offer insight into effective fisheries 
management. The development of the concepts of resource and market equilibrium 
(“Maximum Sustainable Yield" and "Maximum Economic Yield") were applied to the 
management of commercial species and, in the majority of cases, helped to explain 
stock decline. Notwithstanding the availability of increasingly strong and 
sophisticated computing capacities, the models developed remained attached to the 
analysis of mono-specific stocks. It was about herring of the North Sea, the cod of 
Newfoundland, the sardine of Morocco, the tuna of the Gulf of Guinea, etc. By 
ignoring interactions between the species (2), and of the species with the marine 
environment, the bio-economic models fostered:   
 5
- the reduction of the reality to a simple problem of revenue maximization 
(fishing management becomes a technical exercise – requiring the adjustment 
of fishing effort to the availability of the resource); 
- the illusion of the simplicity of the functioning of the marine environment (the 
system is presumed to be in/moving towards equilibrium  - and so fails to take 
into account resource variability over time and space and the diversity of 
living resources within an eco-system);   
- the partitioning of reality (insofar as the biologist deals only with biological 
aspects such as stock recruitment, the economist deals with the economic 
agenda, while the manager assumes responsibility for the introduction of given 
policies);   
- the mistaking of the object of fishing management (insofar as the focus 
became managing the species of commercial value - without considering the 
place of these species within an ecosystem).   
      The reductionism of contemporary management models therefore leads to an 
impasse. This impasse can be seen in the following diagram which presents, in a 
simplified manner, how fisheries are generally perceived by traditional managers, 
economists and biologists. Relations between the entities are unilateral. The 
government impacts on the fleet and their activities through management measures 
such as prohibiting certain types of gear, introducing quotas and setting total 
allowable catch quotas (TACs).  It also acts in the market by means of regulations 
relating to food safety, food quality and/or price control. The ecosystem is reduced to 
a residual – to be impacted upon – as fish stocks fluctuate in line with the policies 
introduced.  
FIGURE 1 about here 
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     Such a perception of reality ensured that only costs of production, processing and 
marketing are considered (referred to henceforth as “production” costs). These costs 
are of a private nature and are the only ones incurred by producers - even if the 
productive activity generates a series of indirect effects, both on the marine 
environment and on civil society in general. Economists generally refer to these 
indirect effects as “externalities” (3). In the case of fisheries there are a number of 
such externalities which, while not integrated into the production sphere as private 
costs, are crucial for the well-being of the fishery.  
     In the economic and social sphere: 
- The costs of fishing management (primarily research, design and application 
of management measures, control and monitoring) – which Arnason (1999) 
found reached 30% of the value of landings in the USA, and 25% of the value 
in Newfoundland.   
- The public subsidy of fishing activity (this can take the form of financial 
support for the construction and modernization of boats, exemption from taxes 
and customs duties, state payments for access rights to the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) of third countries, etc.)  (OECD, 2000 and 2003);    
- The opportunity costs related to the extraction of marine resources through 
fishing, rather than their exploitation in other ways (eco-tourism ventures, for 
example);  
     In the natural sphere:  
- By-catch (Wiium [1999], for example, suggests that 14 kg and 7 kg of fish 
respectively are discarded as by-catch for each kilo of shrimps or octopi 
landed, by-catch being equivalent to as much as 26% of world landings).  
 7
- The destruction of natural services (oceanic function as a carbon and pollution 
“sink”, the stability of the marine environment etc) which ensure marine 
patrimony. 
- The destruction of particular properties and functions of the ecosystem (for 
example, Pauly, Christensen and Coelho [1999] and Curry, Shannon and Shin 
(2001) note how the over-fishing of certain levels of the trophic chain 
generates disturbances which are reflected through the whole ecosystem)  
- Irreversibility of the damage caused (the resilience of the environment and 
ecosystems is very variable, and more sensitive systems may be irrevocably 
damaged – to the detriment of both current and future generations).  
     The market price is supposed, in standard economic theory, to act as indicator of 
scarcity (value) and as a behavioral signal. In the fisheries case, price can account for 
the increasing scarcity of the resource – but it will not be capable of securing the 
ecosystem against over-fishing of species. It does not therefore function as an 
effective mechanism regarding the incidence/impact of fishing - both at the societal 
and natural level - since it ignores or belittles the external costs of fishing activity. 
The limits of traditional fishing management approaches are therefore reached.   
From the notion of value to the concept of social cost 
An asymmetry develops between the use of marine resources as consumption 
products and as generators of environmental services due to the shortcomings of the 
market pricing system. Such a situation presents a very real challenge to the public 
authorities as inertia would almost certainly lead to resource overexploitation - and so 
it is consequently imperative to take affirmative action so as to compensate for the 
shortcomings of the market pricing system. In some instances, the creation of a 
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market of negotiable quotas - starting from a given global quantitative constraint – 
can help reveal a market price which better reflects the marginal opportunity cost of 
the fishing activity. Yet the opportunity cost disclosed does not necessarily reflect the 
full value of the ecosystem, it merely provides additional information on one possible 
productive use of the eco-system.  There is thus a gap between what the opportunity 
cost (marginal) of fishing suggests – and which managers use to optimize the 
allocation of resources - and external costs, as noted above. To remedy this we need 
to include prices reflecting all external societal and natural effects, but this requires 
knowledge of all the various use values which can be encountered in the marine 
environment. The diagram below tries to give an indication of these;   
FIGURE 2 here 
     The marine environment delivers several broad services; the extraction of 
commercial and subsistence resources, the provision of factors of production, and 
ecosystem services. If the first two functionalities are measurable using indicators of 
price, the third is not so easily reducible to a monetary variable. Yet these services are 
of primary importance for the functioning of the marine environment and, in 
particular, the production of marine resources. Fortunately, it seems that there is a 
possibility of integrating those external costs (which contribute to the degradation of 
the ecosystem and its services) into an evaluation of the “true” cost of fishing policies 
through recourse to the notion of social – or societal -- cost. The concept of social 
cost, first enunciated by Pigou (1920) and subsequently developed by Coase (1960), 
was formulated to allow for the “internalisation” of externalities. They suggested that 
compensation was in order in those instances when the activities of economic agents 
caused a nuisance (externality) to the well-being of others. Although the concept of 
social cost as formulated by Coase and his successors only measured nuisance in 
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human terms, we contend that the approach is equally applicable when considering 
disturbances caused to ecological systems. 
     However, taking into account the external effects associated with a fishing activity 
requires a change in our understanding of the operational dynamics of fisheries. The 
following diagram illustrates the complexity of incorporating such effects within the 
marine environment. Now a social request is added to the production demand of the 
fishery to reflect not just intergenerational concerns, but also current non-market 
values of the ecosystem (this includes the range of use values given in the right hand 
boxes of Figure 2). The ecosystem is thus a new actor in the fishery landscape. 
Formerly reduced to the various stocks exploited by the fishery, the ecosystem is now 
placed centrally within the landscape and viewed as having functions and properties 
which it is advisable to preserve (see Figure 3 below).   
FIGURE 3 here 
     Thus, the analysis in terms of rights to pursue a certain strategy is simply one 
option within a portfolio of competing rights which, in the fisheries context, might 
include:   
- the right to catch fish, and to reject/discard those which are not wanted (the 
by-catch);   
- the right to continue fishing, despite evidence suggesting that stocks are being 
degraded/are in ill-health;   
- the right to one to contribute to the loss of functionality of the ecosystem by 
destroying some of its properties, functions or elements. 
     The question then is the following:  how is it possible to limit - even suppress - the 
rights of the ship-owners to degrade stocks and the ecosystem? The contemplation of 
a framework which integrates societal costs with a dynamic ecological model which 
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reflects the relationships between the various trophic levels while contextualizing the 
economic drivers of fishing activity may then offer some prospects for capturing the 
non-market effects associated with the activity and, in this way, come to offer a better 
view of a complex reality.  
Towards an economic and social extension of the ECOPATH-ECOSYM model 
The Ecopath model, as delineated in this issue by Christensen, Aiken and Villanueva 
(2007), is a functional representation of the ecosystem which can be used as a starting 
point for developing a framework to evaluate the social cost of fishing activities and, 
more particularly, to inform development projects and management plans.  
     The basic idea is to apply the iterative process which characterises Ecopath as a 
method of measuring - in an incremental way - what occurs in the ecosystem when a 
fisherman uses a particular fishing gear (such as a trawl). The following figure shows 
the ecological costs that result from the first iteration.   
FIGURE 4 fait 
     The costs related to the activities of management, the public subsidy of fishing 
activity etc. are costs which can be expressed in monetary form. They are thus easily 
added to the private costs. On the other hand, the reduction in the functionality of the 
ecosystem due to the use of trawl nets is more difficult to express in monetary terms. 
While it may be possible to allot a monetary value, this value is still likely to only 
capture those ecosystem goods and services which have a commercial value, and 
other non-market outcomes such as ecosystem degradation will continue to remain 
unpriced (and so undervalued).  
     It is of course possible to compare what the ecosystem in good health (situation 
before fishing) produces and relate this to the ex-post scenario of fishing and over-
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fishing to obtain the difference in expected incomes. However, a reduction in trophic 
levels (or a shortening of the food chain) can lead to an increase in biological 
productivity (Palomares and Pauly 2004), or even to the subsequent extraction of 
species such as shellfish or cephalopods with greater commercial value. Even here 
though, in simply conceiving of the ecosystem as a natural entity intended to produce 
fish for human consumption, we are guilty of disregarding its remit in the regulation 
of climate, the absorption of CO2, etc. Thus, ecological costs related to the 
degradation of the ecosystem through over-fishing must ultimately be quantified if the 
resulting model is to be a robust one.  
     The renewal/continuation of fishing activities will be reflected (as shown by figure 
5) by both an increase in private costs due to the increased scarcity of the targeted 
species (while this is compensated to some degree by rising sales prices, declining 
marginal elasticities of the demand will not fully offset the revenue loss), but also by 
ecosystem change.  
FIGURE 5 here fait 
     The immediate consequence of such a situation, which is becoming increasingly 
commonplace across the world today, is that the cessation of fishing for a particular 
species – or at a particular level of the trophic chain – sees fishing effort redirected 
towards other species lower down the trophic chain. In other words, fishers target 
increasingly smaller and smaller species.  
Modelling the complexity of ecological, economical and sociological interactions: 
model choice and the concept of societal cost 
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As mentioned earlier, in a market economy, the majority of goods and services are 
assigned by price. Price acts as a signal to producers and consumers and allows them 
to adjust their production and consumption decisions accordingly. It is an indicator of 
relative scarcity under conditions of current (and anticipated) supply and demand. 
However, the resources and services offered by oceans, and nature in general (fauna 
and wild flora, water, air, ecosystems, etc), are outside the market. They don’t have a 
price. And, without a price indicating the importance of the sacrifices made in order to 
obtain or conserve them, economic agents have the tendency to presume that their 
price is zero. There are, as a consequence, innumerable instances where natural assets 
have been sacrificed because their intrinsic values have been ignored in economic 
calculations.  
     Yet if economists attempt to put a price on natural assets, philosophers urge them 
to exercise caution in seeking to quantify human perceptions regarding nature. If A. 
Sen (1987) has restored an ethical dimension to economics, Collet (2001 and 2002), 
R.  Larrère (1994) and C. Larrère (1997) have pointed out the necessity to go a step 
further and analyse our relationship with nature – first by discarding dualistic 
approaches to human kind and nature (the intrinsic value of nature approach), and 
second by redefining the interactive relationship between humans and nature using the 
notion of ecocentrism. Under this more novel approach, the choices we make 
regarding how to utilize natural systems have fundamental implications for their 
maintenance, and ultimately therefore for the sustainability of the services they 
provide. That is why ethics is a key issue in marine natural resource management (see 
Collet’s [2007] paper in this issue).  
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     The choice of the model is fundamental to the management of natural resources. 
Until now, the main models used have been neo-classical models (initially developed 
by Gordon-Schaefer, later extended by Clark, Munro, Bjørndal, see Anderson (1986) 
for a general review). They are usually used to measure the economic effects of 
fishing activities through reference to the stock level and fishing capacities. The 
advantage of such models resides in their simplicity and transparency, it being 
possible to reproduce them once a certain amount of basic data has been collected, 
and they have been widely applied in Europe and throughout the world. While they 
have, in effect, proved themselves through such widespread use, such use has also 
highlighted their limitations - particularly as regards their (in)ability to give a 
complete picture of the full impact of fishing activities. Accounts of fishings effect 
on the natural environment are either omitted completely, or considered solely in 
terms of the target species under consideration. The effects on the underlying 
ecosystem are never taken into account, consideration of their economic and social 
impact is limited to the creation of jobs, value added, and effect on public revenues  
while the costs borne by civil society in management and/or restoring damaged 
ecosystems are invariably ignored (Failler and des Clers, 2002). The primary purpose 
of such models therefore is to consider the private profit involved, without taking into 
account the costs borne by society and the ecosystems themselves. 
     Since the beginning of the 1990s, new types of ecosystem models have emerged 
which provide a more comprehensive understanding of the structure, function, and 
regulation of major ecosystems (see Mann, 1988; Pahl-Wostl, 1993; and Gaedke, 
1995, for example). Mass-balance biomass models (such as Ecopath and the inverse 
methods model) are being used globally to systematically describe ecosystems and to 
explore their properties (see Vézina and Platt, 1988; Christensen and Pauly, 1992 and 
 14
1993; and Pauly and Christensen, 1996). Mass-balance descriptions of trophic 
interactions between all the functional groups of the ecosystem recognise the 
complexity of the habitat and provide valuable information on the health of the 
marine environment.  
     Integrated economic-biological-ecological models have also been developed since 
the beginning of the 1990s. Integration is possible because of the predominant use of 
mathematics in biology, economics and ecology. Mathematical models are used to 
analyse and study relationships in each of the disciplines, and this commonality 
provides a conducive environment for integration. Linkages between the different 
disciplines generally precedes in one of two ways. One method is to extend the 
originally formulated model towards the other spheres and integrate the foreign 
components into a modified model which retains a degree of disciplinary bias. 
Ecologists, for instance, have developed what we might term ecology-cum-
economic models that rely on the use of system dynamics to investigate how the 
ecological system behaves under a specified set of policy instruments. Economists, on 
the other hand, have produced economic-cum-ecology models to help determine 
optimal policy responses within a given system. However, while they have been 
diligent in modeling robust and dynamic economic systems, they have been as guilty 
as the ecologists in downplaying the dynamics of the other system. A second 
method is to construct a new model through interdisciplinary work, each discipline 
bringing its own tools and ideas into a common core framework. The consilience 
principle can also act as a bridge, helping to link facts and fact-based theories across 
disciplines so as to create a common groundwork (Wilson, 1998). Nevertheless, and 
despite the impressive recent advances in computer technology, truly integrative 
models have only been developed within the climate change community. Natural and 
 15
marine resources management models are largely still designed according to neo-
classical norms (4).   
The ECOST model  
The ECOST project attempts to move the discussion further forward, developing a 
methodology that can assist policy or decision makers in assessing fishery practice 
and thus inform fisheries management. Not only does it embrace the integrated 
assessment models developed over the last twenty years, it seeks to extend such 
models into the societal or social domain. It does this by constructing a new model 
through interdisciplinary endeavour, using the consilience principle as an analytic 
cement to fuse social, economic and ecological systems into an integrated assessment 
model that can address the interrelationships between the three systems while 
maintaining detailed disciplinary descriptions of each of the systems. Figure 6 below 
shows that the economic system consists of production, processing, and distribution. 
Production has an impact on the biomass of the species and thus affects the ecological 
system. While economic activity creates products, it also generates and distributes 
income among factors of production (incomes which are subsequently distributed 
among people). The distribution of personal income can have profound implications 
for the social system. Equally, fishing effort varies across fishing metiers and the 
selection (non-selection) of these will have differential impacts on the ecological 
system, employment and functional income in the sector, besides further affecting 
other parts of the economic and social systems. 
FIGURE 6 here 
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     The economic activity of fishing occurs because the social system demands the 
consumption of fish. The social system benefits from consumption of fish (social 
benefit of consumption) while incurring a number of operational costs - production, 
processing, distribution and service costs (economic cost of operation). The functional 
income distribution resulting from the fishing activity may disturb the social system, 
thereby imposing costs (social cost of disturbance). If the economic system intends to 
correct the disturbance, the correction introduces a cost (economic cost of correction), 
although socially the correction is beneficial (social benefit of improvement). 
     Equally, economic activity may lead to a degradation of the ecological system 
(ecological cost of degradation), as resource stocks are identified (economic benefit of 
exploration). If action is taken to reverse the degradation, costs will be incurred 
(economic cost of restoration), although the ecological system will benefit from 
ecosystem restoration (ecological benefit of restoration). In the absence of policies to 
reverse degradation, degradation (or depletion) may trigger greater fishing effort that 
reduces the social value of the marine environment, imposing further costs (economic 
and social cost of depletion). The ecological system can also benefit through resource 
protection or management (ecological benefit of protection or management). Figure 7 
below summarises all these interactions.  
FIGURE 7 here 
Societal costs and benefits   
While all economic costs can be measured in monetary terms, ecological cost is 
assessed through comparing current catches with historical levels of stock biomass, 
social costs are usually identified through indices such as the poverty index, 
consumption ratio, nutritional intake and gender (in)equity. Therefore in the ECOST 
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model we seek to convert social and ecological costs into monetary terms using 
economic costs and benefits analysis. The equations below present the various 
variables and structural relationships that support the ECOST model.  
Society = social system + economic system + ecological system 
Societal benefit = social benefit + economic benefit + ecological benefit 
Societal cost = social cost + economic cost + ecological cost 
Then:  
Net social benefits = social benefits - social costs 
Net economic benefits = economic benefits - economic costs 
Net ecological benefit = ecological benefits - ecological costs 
Social benefits = social benefit (consumption) + social benefits (improvement of 
poverty, inequality, gender)  
                        = value of consumption + economic costs (correction) 
Social costs = social cost (disturbance) + social cost (depletion) 
                        = economic cost (correction) + willingness-to-pay 
Economic benefits = surplus 
Economic costs = economic cost (operation) + economic cost (correction) + economic 
cost (depletion) 
Ecological benefits = ecological benefit (protection) + ecological benefit (restoration) 
                                = social cost (depletion) + economic cost (restoration) 
                                = willingness-to-pay + economic cost (depletion)  
Ecological costs = ecological cost (degradation)  
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                           = economic cost (depletion) + [net economic benefit with action  
net economic benefit with rest] + [net social benefit with action  net social benefit 
with rest]  
Household, employment and income 
We break down the fishing sector into four constituent parts: 
-Small-scale fisheries 
-Industrial fisheries - workers 
-Industrial fisheries - capitalists 
-Government (representing the population outside the fisheries sector).                                
and fisher employment can be classified into 13 groups according to the nature of the 
productive operation:  
(1) Production 
-Small-scale fishers (m/f)  
-Industrial fisheries - workers (m/f) 
-Industrial fisheries - capitalists (m/f) 
-Foreign fleets - government 
(2) Processing 
-Industrial fisheries - workers (m/f) 
-Industrial fisheries - capitalists (m/f) 
(3) Distribution 
-Small-scale dealer (m/f)  
-Retailers (m/f) 
-Local wholesaler (m/f) 
 19
-Exporter 
(4) Business services 
-Small-scale worker (m/f)  
-Industrial worker (m/f) 
-Industrial capitalist (m/f) 
Once population and employment are integrated into our model, we allocate incomes 
to each employment group (and also to each population group). 
(1) Small-scale fisheries group average income: 
N  population size 
L  labour force employed 
Y  total income 
AY  average income 
ss  small-scale 
sf  small-scale fisher 
sd  small-scale dealer 
sw  small-scale worker 
Then, total income:   
And, average income per labourer:  
While average income per capita is: 
(2) Group average income for industrial fishers (workers)  
swswsdsdsfsfss LAYLAYLAYY 
ss
ssL
ss L
YY 
ss
ssN
ss N
YY 
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ine industrial  fisheries employee 
ifw  industrial fishing worker 
ipw  industrial processing worker 
rt  retailer 
is  industrial service worker 
m - metier 
Total income: 
Average income per fisherman across metier:  
Average income per labour unit:  
Average income per capita:  
(3) Group average income for industrial fishers (capitalist)  
ik  industrial  skipper 
ipc  industrial capitalist (processing) 
lw  local wholesaler 
ex  exporter 
isc  industrial service worker (capitalist) 
Total income: 
Average income per skipper:   
m
m
ik
m
ikik LAYAY
ine
ineN
ine N
YAY 
isciscexexlwlwipcipcikikinc LAYLAYLAYLAYLAYY 
isisrtrtipwipwifwifwine LAYLAYLAYLAYY 
 
m
m
ifw
m
ifwifw LAYAY
ine
ineL
ine L
YAY 
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Average income per crew member:  
Average income per capitalist:  
(4) Government income from foreign fleets 
         price of access rights 
        - quantity of effort 
Total government revenue from foreign fleets:  
Per capita government revenue from foreign fleets: 
Social indicators 
A number of social indicators  such as level of poverty, degree of inequality, gender 
inequity and the extent of food (in)security  can be derived with respect to these 
sectoral and employment groupings. In the case of poverty, we may use either Sen's 
comprehensive index or the FGT index (see 1 and 2 below); for inequality, we may 
use the Gini coefficient (see also 1 below); for gender inequity, we are currently 
exploring the benefits of using the ratio of total income [women] to total income [men 
and women] (see 3 below). In the case of food security, we are presently 
experimenting with the use of average fish consumption rates (see 4 below). These 
four individual measures can also be blended into a composite measure with given 
weights (see 5 below). The subsequent step will then require the development of a 
methodology that equates these social indices with the economic-ecology part of the 
ECOST model.   
inc
incL
inc L
YAY 
GP
GQ
GGG QPY 
N
YAY
G
N 
inc
incN
inc N
YAY 
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(1) Sens comprehensive measure of poverty (Sen, 1976) 
Sens poverty index is a comprehensive measure of poverty in the sense that it 
incorporates the numbers in poverty (poverty headcount), the extent to which the 
income of these poor individuals falls below the poverty line (poverty gap), and the 
degree of societal inequality. Let: 
S  Sen poverty index 
H  the poverty headcount ratio 
I  the poverty gap ( in percentage terms) 
G  Gini coefficient of inequality 
Then 
S will always be between 0 and 1 (The closer to 1 is the index, the worse is the social 
situation). 
(2) The FGT measure of poverty (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984). 
The FGT poverty measure is also called the P-alpha poverty index, and is another 
comprehensive index.  If  = 0, the P-alpha index reduces to the poverty headcount. If  
 = 1, it measures both the poverty headcount and the poverty gap. If  = 2, it reflects 
the poverty headcount, poverty gap and societal inequality.  
Denote: 
        P-alpha poverty index 
AY   poverty line 
i  ith group 
n  number of groups 
P
  GIIHS  1
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Then, 
for   all 
(3) Gender development index 
Many factors have been used to reflect women’s lower social status, lower earnings 
level and reduced participation rates. The ECOST model presently seeks to capture 
gender inequity by comparing the total female income with total income (male and 
female) as this can represent the effects of both earnings and employment 
discrimination. Let then: 
W – gender development index 
Yw – total income of women in each group 
Ym – total income of men in each group  
i – ith group 
So we have 
The gender development index will be always between 0 and 1. In most cases it is 
likely to be below 0.5, although in cases where female employment is higher than 
male employment (which is often the case in the distribution part of the fish chain) it 
can exceed 0.5.  
2,1,0 or
 
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AYAY
P i
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(4) Food security index 
Fish consumption is an important indicator for food security, as it reflects the average 
nutritional intake of each individual in the society. As the current highest level of fish 
consumption in developed countries is below 50 KG per capita, we take 50 KG as a 
benchmark – and calculate the ratio of local per capita fish consumption to 50 KG. 
The ratio will lie between 0 and 1 (the closer the index is to 1 the better is the local 
food security situation).  
F – fish consumption index 
FC – average fish consumption of each fishery group in KG 
i – ith group 
50 – 50 KG consumption of fish 
C – constant 
     – average price of fish 
(5) A composite measure of social wellbeing 
The above indices (1-4) reflect - or measure - the status of a social system from 
differing perspectives. The advantage of a composite measure is that it can blend all 
P
50
i
i
FCF 
21 
ii AYPCFC 
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these individual indices into a unified index that reflects societal change. However, 
blending should be exercised with caution.  
   Let then:  
SI – composite social index 
– weight,  and:  
We have  
     The composite social index will always be between 0 and 1 inclusive. However, 
values approaching 1 are not necessarily better (and, equally, values approaching 0 
are not necessarily worse) but simply serve to indicate the aggregate nature of change. 
Examination of the individual social indices is necessary in order to evaluate the 
desirability of the societal changes that have occurred. 
Conclusion  
Ecological assets are common pool resources (public goods), although the consequent 
externalities associated with their use are not usually well accounted for in market 
mechanisms. In response, introducing the concept of societal cost into the policy 
debate demands the capture (and hence allows the internalisation) of these 
externalities. However, the notion of societal cost is not widely addressed in the 
scientific literature. While Nadav (2000) and Garcia-Alte, Olle, Antoñanzas and 
Colom (2002) have employed the concept to discuss sociological change at the 
societal level, we contend that it should take a broader meaning. Not only should it 
embrace; (i) “total economic value” - the measurement of the monetary and non-
monetary values of the services rendered by the environment (actual use value), of 
services that it may potentially be able to render in the future (optional value) and the 
1321  
321 
iiii WFSSI 

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value of the existence of the former (existence value) (Pearce, 1996); but also (ii)  the 
“marginal cost of replacement” - the cost of replacing the services currently provided 
by a piece of nature (Arrow, K, G. Daily, P. Dasgupta, S. Levin, K.-G.Mäler, E. 
Maskin, D. Starrett, T. Sterner, T. Tietenberg , 1999); and  (iii) the functional value of 
a species in an ecosystem - and the function of one particular ecosystem  within the 
wider ecosystem (Christensen and Pauly, 1993). Thus, the societal cost can be 
interpreted as a shared concept uniting ecology, economics and sociology.  
     The concept (societal cost), we contend, can be beneficially employed in helping 
to analyse - and then address - some of the common issues that fisheries in West 
Africa, South-East Asia and the Greater Antilles are facing, namely:  
- The (surplus) capacity of the fishing fleets operating in national and 
international waters (Chavance, Bâ et al. 2004); 
- The loss of biodiversity and biomasses (Christensensen, 2004) that has 
occurred over the last 50 years;  
- Increased poverty – either at the local level [in fishing communities] or at the 
national level [proxied by an increase in external indebtedness] (Failler and 
Kane, 2003; Kaimowitz, Thiele and Pacheco, 1999; Kessler and Van Dorp, 
1998; Muradian and Martinez-Alier, 2001);  
- * The introduction of fishing management practices designed to resolve the 
problem of over fishing – but which, in doing so, raise the cost of fishing 
activities, erect barriers to entry into the fishery, and create a dependence on 
subsidies (Tietenberg, 2003).  
     The dimension of the fishery problem can no longer be confined to a local level. 
As Kurien (2003) pointed out: 
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“the macro trend of globalisation and the counteracting micro trend of localisation in many 
‘tropical-majority’ world countries give rise to the need for new approaches to governance at both 
levels”. p. 10. 
     ECOST – the project and its end-product (the ECOST model) – is intended to help 
address this. Central to the project is the logic of the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation (JPoI): to restore as much as possible marine ecosystems by 2015, a 
logic that is also in accord with the philosophy of the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries (Doulman, 2007). To meet this challenge, the project mobilises, 
on top of the sixteen renowned scientific organisations entrusted with carrying out the 
applied research, seven regional and international UN development and management 
organisations. It also maintains close links to key NGOs in order to facilitate 
interaction with social actors and the dissemination of findings and policy 
prescriptions to the various levels of decision-making (local, national, regional and 
international). In this way, the concept of societal costs – which this paper presents 
preliminary sketches thereof – trekked through fishing activities and fishery policies, 
will contribute to the more effective management of the oceans. 
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Notes 
 (1) In the West African case, see the results of the Project of co-operation "Fishery 
Information and Analysis System" at: http://www.ird.sn/activites/sih/symposium /  
(2) See Curry, Shannon and Shin  (2001) for a complete presentation of the 
functioning of ecosystems and relationships between species.   
(3) Externalities occur when the action of one agent impacts on the wellbeing of other 
agents (and such agents are not compensated for this impact via the market). 
Externalities can be positive (effect of a vaccination campaign for example), or 
negative (pollution for example) (Boncoeur et Olivier, 1996).   
 (4) One exception to this is the attempt made by the European Project PECHDEV.   
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